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ALASKA, THE LAST STATEHOOD
CONSTITUTION, AND
SUBNATIONAL RIGHTS AND
GOVERNANCE*
ROBERT F. WILLIAMS**
By being among the last states to write a constitution, we now
have the advantages of correcting the mistakes of others,
simplicity, and the delegation of responsibility, which can be
clearly seen by our citizens. Rather than expressing details, as
did the constitutions of many states, ours set broad goals for the
new state of Alaska. Details would come later during the
legislative process.
-Former Alaska Governor Tony Knowles1
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* This is an extended version of a presentation delivered at the University of
Alaska Anchorage on October 12, 2018, commemorating the 60th anniversary of
the Alaska Constitution.
** Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School; Director, Center for
State Constitutional Studies.
1. Tony Knowles, Foreword to GERALD A. MCBEATH, THE ALASKA STATE
CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE xix, xx (1997).
[I]n state constitution-making we must be content with something less
than the Platonic ideal; we must aim rather for a constitutional document
that is designed to enable the state to carry on its work of government
today and in the foreseeable future with efficiency and economy and
with adequate powers to undertake its tasks . . . Viewed in that light, we
are likely to discover that a flexible and adaptable instrument that helps
us in the solution of today’s problems is likely to be effective, with only
minor modifications, in managing tomorrow’s tasks as well. It is
precisely the broad and flexible charters of the late nineteenth century
that were too closely concerned with the solutions of many narrowly
specific and immediate problems that have become obsolete and that
interfere with contemporary solutions because of their mass of detail and
resulting rigidity.
FRANK P. GRAD & ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY: DRAFTING STATE CONSTITUTIONS, REVISIONS, AND AMENDMENTS 7–8
(2006); see also id. at 14–30.
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One of the dismaying realities of American legal education,
particularly at its most elite level, is the abject ignorance
displayed about the importance of state constitutions and even
of state judiciaries, even though most of the common law cases
that students read arise in state courts. Still, too many students
may well graduate from three years of legal study with the
perception that the only Constitution operating within the
United States is the national document and that the only courts
one need really focus on are federal courts, particularly, of
course, the United States Supreme Court.
-Professor Sanford Levinson2

I. INTRODUCTION
The editors of the Alaska Law Review are to be commended for taking
the state constitution seriously.3 This is, of course, nothing new because
the Alaska Law Review has, since its inception, included important
scholarship on the Alaska Constitution.
Alaska’s 1955-56 Constitutional Convention was the penultimate
step in a decades-long campaign for Alaskan statehood.4 When Alaska
finally gained its statehood, its state constitution took its place with the
other forty-nine American subnational constitutions. While preparing the
Alaska Constitution, delegates to Alaska’s 1955–56 Constitutional
Convention might well have echoed the words Delegate John Dickinson
uttered at the beginning of the 1787 Federal Constitutional Convention:
“Experience must be our only guide.”5 This theme of building on the
experiences of other states ran throughout the production of the Alaska
Constitution.
This Article will focus on the general characteristics of American
state, or subnational, constitutions,6 locating the Alaska Constitution
within that state constitutional tradition rather than our federal

2. Sanford V. Levinson, Foreword to MICHAEL L. BUENGER & PAUL J. DE
MUNIZ, AMERICAN JUDICIAL POWER: THE STATE COURT PERSPECTIVE ix (2015).
3. See e.g., Robert C. Welsh & Ronald K. L. Collins, Taking State Constitutions
Seriously, CENTER MAG., Sept.–Oct. 1981, at 6.
4. Michael Schwaiger, Understanding the Unoriginal: Indeterminant
Originalism and Independent Interpretation of the Alaska Constitution, 22 ALASKA L.
REV. 293, 303 n.45 (2005).
5. Robert F. Williams, “Experience Must Be Our Only Guide”: The State
Constitutional Experience of the Framers of the Federal Constitution, 15 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 403, 421 (1988).
6. American state constitutions, of course, are internal constitutions that
operate within the dominant Federal Constitution. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW
OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 17 (2009).
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constitutional tradition. This focus will include a brief discussion of “New
Judicial Federalism,” where state courts interpret their state constitutions
to provide broader protective rights than those recognized by the United
States Supreme Court under the Federal Constitution. I will then discuss
specific characteristics of the Alaska Constitution and judicial
interpretations of it, within the national context.

II. THE ALASKA CONSTITUTION AS A SUBNATIONAL
CONSTITUTION
An article by my long-time Rutgers Political Science colleague, Alan
Tarr, perceptively locates the current Alaska Constitution within its
comparative “time and place.”7 Each of the constitutions of the nonoriginal states is part of an epic story of that state’s transition from
colonial or territorial status to statehood. Consequently, as pointed out by
former-Governor Knowles above, Alaskans had the benefit of these epic
stories of virtually all of the other states. Alaskans could look to these
states’ experiences both with their initial constitutions and after their
admissions to the Union as they continued to tinker with provisions on
government structure, rights guarantees, and the entrenchment of policy
matters in their state constitutions.8 One recent analyst of Wisconsin’s
statehood constitution-making process stated:
Western state formation, even in its concrete form of
constitutional conventions and founding texts, required a touch
of fiction . . . . For the writing of a constitution necessitated that
Wisconsin citizens imagine their state in its future life. In other
words, they had to engage in a kind of (political) science fiction.9
The experiences of other states make this exercise in imagination easier,
but not necessarily simple, for later-formed states like Alaska.
About half of the states in the United States were admitted to the
Union pursuant to a congressional “enabling act.” These enactments
directed territories seeking statehood in a number of specific ways with
respect to processes for drafting their proposed constitutions, and often
required the inclusion of specific constitutional provisions. Alaska was
7. G. Alan Tarr, Of Time, Place and the Alaska Constitution, 35 ALASKA L. REV.
155 (2018).
8. See generally James A. Henretta, Foreword: Rethinking the State
Constitutional Tradition, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 819 (1991) (tracking the development,
decline, and rebirth of influence of state constitutions).
9. BETHEL SALER, THE SETTLERS’ EMPIRE: COLONIALISM AND STATE FORMATION
IN AMERICA’S OLD NORTHWEST 249 (2015) (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 2
(“United States is a ‘settler nation’ . . . These settler societies possess an ambivalent
double history as both colonized and colonizers.”).
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not admitted pursuant to an enabling act, so it proceeded toward
statehood without such advance direction.10 Alaska was free from
congressional requirements that could have had lasting effects on Alaska
after joining the Union.11 Despite this apparent independence, the Alaska
Constitutional Convention seems to have limited itself by focusing on
presenting a statehood constitution to Congress that would most easily
lead to acceptance into the Union.12 This focus often came at the expense
of innovation in the constitution.
Alaska’s decision not to innovate in its constitution was
understandable in the context of its quest for statehood and desire to
avoid congressional delay. However, it also illustrates a broader point
about American state constitutions and, indeed, subnational constitutions
worldwide. Our Federal Constitution leaves an expansive “subnational
constitutional space,” allowing states to innovate in the design of their
state constitutions.13 There are common variations in our state
constitutions such as elected or appointed judiciaries, plural or single
executives, differing rights guarantees, etc., but there are very few true
innovations in state constitutions. Only one state has a unicameral
legislature;14 none have a parliamentary system.15 The subnational
constitutional space in other nations’ federal constitutions is less
expansive, but it is still underutilized, as in America.16 Alaska’s
experience of choosing to forego innovation in favor of easier acceptance
into the Union, provides one understandable reason for this
phenomenon.

10. Tarr, supra note 7, at 163.
11. See, e.g., Fain Land & Cattle Co. v. Hassell, 790 P.2d 242, 597–98 (Ariz.
1990) (restricting Arizona’s disposal of state trust lands to methods enumerated
in the Enabling Act and included in the Arizona Constitution). For a detailed
analysis of the kinds of provisions required from states seeking admission to the
Union, contained in the enabling acts, see Eric Biber, The Price of Admission: Causes,
Effects, and Patterns of Conditions Imposed on the States Entering the Union, 46 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 119, 120 (2004) (explaining congressional history of imposing
additional burdens on admission to the Union).
12. Schwaiger, supra note 4, at 303–04.
13. Robert F. Williams & G. Alan Tarr, Subnational Constitutional Space: A View
From the States, Provinces, Regions, Länder, and Cantons, in FEDERALISM,
SUBNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS, AND MINORITY RIGHTS 3, 4–5 (G. Alan Tarr, Robert F.
Williams & Joseph Marko eds., 2004); Robert F. Williams, Teaching and Researching
Comparative Subnational Constitutional Law, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 1109, 1112 (2011).
14. NEB. CONST. art III, § 1. See infra note 51 and accompanying text (analyzing
practical development and usage of Nebraska Constitution).
15. Jonathan Zasloft, Why No Parliaments in the United States?, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L
L. 269, 270 (2013).
16. Williams & Tarr, supra note 13, at 14–15; Williams, supra note 13, at 1114–
15.
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American state constitutions differ in many important respects from
the more familiar Federal Constitution. Unlike the federal constitutional
process, state constitutions and their amendments emanate directly from
the people of the state through votes on new constitutions, revisions, and
amendments.17 This provides a constitutional interpretation technique
that is not available in federal constitutional doctrine, where state
constitutional provisions can be seen as the “voice of the people.” This
means that voters’ pamphlets and guides, and even newspaper analyses
can be relevant when interpreting the meaning of the state constitution.18
In the words of the New Jersey Supreme Court:
It is a familiar rule of construction that where phraseology is
precise and unambiguous there is no room for judicial
interpretation or for resort to extrinsic materials. The language
speaks for itself, and where found in our State Constitution the
language is the voice of the people. As this Court said some
twenty years ago,
[T]he Constitution derives its force, not from the
Convention which framed it, but from the people who
ratified it: and the intent to be arrived at is that of the people.
The Constitution was written “to be understood by the
voters: its words and phrases were used in their normal and
ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning”; and
“where the intention is clear there is no room for
construction and no excuse for interpolation or addition.”19
State constitutions have evolved over the years to include policy matters
and “positive rights” that can (and possibly should) be seen as more
appropriate for statutory law.20 Christopher Hammons formulated the
distinction between “framework-oriented” and “policy-oriented”

17. WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 20. The exception is the state of Delaware, in
which the state constitution may be amended by the legislature.
Article XVI describes two different procedures for changing the
Delaware Constitution. These procedures include an amendment
process by the General Assembly and a revision process by a
constitutional convention. Neither procedure permits the people to vote
directly on proposed changes to the Delaware Constitution. Neither
procedure requires the governor’s approval.
RANDY J. HOLLAND, THE DELAWARE STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 228
(2002).
18. WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 25–27, 315.
19. Vreeland v. Byrne, 370 A.2d 825, 830 (N.J. 1977) (quoting Gangemi v.
Berry, 134 A.2d 1, 16 (N.J. 1957)).
20. WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 22–23.
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provisions in state constitutions, concluding that the national average was
about forty percent policy-oriented.21
Furthermore, while the Federal Constitution enumerates powers for
the federal government, the state constitutions operate within the plenary
powers reserved to the states, where enumerations of power are
unnecessary. As such, instead of delineating additional powers, state
constitutions operate primarily as documents of limitation.22
Additionally, state constitutions are much easier to amend than the
Federal Constitution. Therefore, state constitutions have grown in length
over the years, through additional constitutional conventions or the
amendment process.23
Assessments of American constitutionalism rarely look to state
constitutions, instead focusing exclusively on the Federal Constitution
and its interpretation by the Supreme Court. Focusing on the Federal
Constitution leads to the conclusion that America is “exceptional” when
compared with other nations because of the static nature and absence of
positive rights in the Federal Constitution. However, careful analysis has
recently clarified the possible error of this point of view:
Our analysis reveals three important features of state
constitutions that should prompt reconsideration of US
constitutional exceptionalism. First, like most of the world’s
constitutions, state constitutions are rather long and elaborate,
and they include detailed policy choices. The exceptional
American taste for constitutional brevity, it turns out, is confined
to the federal document alone. Second, like most of the world’s
21. Christopher W. Hammons, State Constitutional Reform: Is it Necessary?, 64
ALB. L. REV. 1327, 1333 (2001). Walter Dodd emphasized an important reason for
“legislation” in state constitutions:
Similar reasons in some cases account for the placing of legislation in the
constitution itself. For example, when the highest state court has
declared unconstitutional a statute limiting labor on public works to
eight hours a day, the people may put into the constitution an
authorization for such legislation, but they may with equal brevity put
the legislative action into the constitution itself.
Walter F. Dodd, The Function of a State Constitution, 30 POL. SCI. Q. 201, 213 (1915);
see also JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS
231–38, 240–46 (1950) (tracking comparative influence of constitution makers,
executives, and legislators).
22. WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 27. Therefore, many of the difficult questions of
judicial interpretation of state constitutions involve implied limitations on power.
Walter F. Dodd, Implied Powers and Implied Limitations in Constitutional Law, 29
YALE L.J. 137, 160 (1919).
23. See generally JOHN J. DINAN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS: GOVERNING
BY AMENDMENT IN THE AMERICAN STATES (2018) (asserting the relative ease of state
amendment processes makes amendments a realistic and regular vehicle for
seeking change).
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constitutions, state constitutions are frequently amended,
overhauled, and replaced. Thus, the textual stability of the overtwo-century-old federal Constitution is exceptional compared
not only with other national constitutions but also with the
constitutions of the American states, which are characterized, in
part, by a commitment to progress and change. Third, like most
of the world’s constitutions, state constitutions contain positive
rights, such as a right to free education, labor rights, social
welfare rights, and environmental rights. While the federal
Constitution arguably omits explicit declarations of these rights,
they are not foreign to the American constitutional tradition. On
all these dimensions, it is at the federal level only that
Americans’ constitutional practices appear exceptional. When
we include the writing and revision of state constitutions in our
assessment, it becomes clear that American constitutionalism is
not nearly as distinctive as most comparative studies and
political commentators have suggested.24
This reinterpretation of American constitutionalism has continued
by evaluating the question of “entrenchment” in constitutions.25
A dominant theme of the constitutional theory literature is that
successful constitutions must not only constrain those in power,
but must do so over long time horizons, establishing constraints
durable enough to bind across generations . . . . By entrenching
commitments, constitutions serve as a mechanism for
overcoming the inconsistency of preferences over time.26
Scholars insist that entrenchment is necessary because it removes matters
from the political agenda and allows political parties to form new
democracies with established rules. Entrenched constitutions are “spare
frameworks,” rigid, and characterized by “generality and abstraction.”27
Again, this may be too narrow a view of the American state constitutions
and other nations’ constitutions:
The model of an entrenched and spare document, which
changes meaning primarily through judicial interpretation,
successfully describes the U.S. Constitution. However, it does a

24. Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism
Revisited, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1641, 1644–45 (2014); see generally EMILY J. ZACKIN,
LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: WHY STATE CONSTITUTIONS
CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS (2013).
25. Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, Constitutions Unentrenched: Toward An
Alternative Theory of Constitutional Design, 110 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 657, 657 (2016).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 658.
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poor job of depicting most other national democratic
constitutions, or even U.S. state constitutions. As we will
demonstrate, specific and unentrenched constitutions
developed over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, and are now the dominant form of constitutionalism
across the globe, and within the U.S. states. We argue that these
polities’ flexible and detailed constitutional texts embody an
alternative model of constitutionalism. Rather than entrenching
constraints through spare and stable texts, these constitutions
provide officeholders—judges, legislatures and executives—
with specific and frequently modified instructions. Although
these flexible constitutions do not entrench commitments over
long time horizons, we argue that they are nonetheless attempts
to constrain the exercise of political power by leaving
empowered actors with fewer choices about which policies to
pursue.28
Thus, we are seeing the beginning of a theoretical reassessment of the
differences between our federal and state constitutions.29 These
reassessments clearly demonstrate that our state constitutions are not
simply little versions of our Federal Constitution. This distinction is
crucial to understanding the Alaska Constitution.

III. ALASKA AND THE NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM
Ravin v. State30 is probably the most well-recognized decision of the
Alaska Supreme Court. In Ravin, the Court held that Alaska’s textual
privacy guarantee31 protected an individual’s right to possess marijuana
in the home.32 As seen in Ravin, the Alaska Supreme Court was a very
early proponent of the New Judicial Federalism, whereby state courts
28. Id.
29. See G. Alan Tarr, Constitutional Theory and State Constitutional
Interpretation, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 841, 842 (1991) (providing an early call for this
theoretical reassessment).
30. 537 P.2d 494, 503 (Alaska 1975). Commentary on this decision has
occupied many pages in this Law Review. See, e.g., John F. Grossbauer, Note,
Alaska’s Right to Privacy Ten Years After Ravin v. State: Developing a Jurisprudence of
Privacy, 2 ALASKA L. REV. 159, 160–69 (1985); Jason Brandeis, The Continuing
Vitality of Ravin v. State: Alaskans Still Have a Constitutional Right to Possess
Marijuana in the Privacy of Their Homes, 29 ALASKA L. REV. 175, 175–236 (2012); Jason
Brandeis, Ravin Revisited: Alaska’s Historic Common Law Marijuana Rule at the Dawn
of Legalization, 32 ALASKA L. REV. 309, 309–47 (2015).
31. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 (“The Right of the People to Privacy is
Recognized and Shall not be Infringed. The Legislature shall implement this
section.”). See also Ken Gormley & Rhonda G. Hartman, Privacy and the States, 65
TEMPLE L. REV. 1279, 1280 (1992) (tracking the development of the right to privacy).
32. Ravin, supra note 30, at 513.
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interpret their own state constitutions to provide more protective rights
than those recognized by United States Supreme Court interpretations of
the Federal Constitution.33 In 1970, for example, long before Justice
William J. Brennan, Jr.’s famous 1977 article encouraging state courts to
go beyond federal constitutional protections,34 the court in Baker v. City of
Fairbanks35 issued the following ringing endorsement of independent state
constitutional law:
[W]e recognize that this result has not been reached in certain
other jurisdictions or by the United States Supreme Court. The
mere fact, however, that the United States Supreme Court has
not extended the right to jury trial to all types of offenses does
not preclude us from acting in this field. While we must enforce
the minimum constitutional standards imposed upon us by the
United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, we are free, and we are under a duty, to develop
additional constitutional rights and privileges under our Alaska
Constitution if we find such fundamental rights and privileges
to be within the intention and spirit of our local constitutional
language and to be necessary for the kind of civilized life and
ordered liberty which is at the core of our constitutional heritage.
We need not stand by idly and passively, waiting for
constitutional direction from the highest court of the land.
Instead, we should be moving concurrently to develop and
expound the principles imbedded in our constitutional law.36
California Supreme Court Justice Goodwin Liu has recently reviewed the
New Judicial Federalism and Justice Brennan’s impact, concluding that
the “redundancy” in the federal and state rights guarantees is an
33. WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 7, 113–19.
34. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977). Justice Brennan’s article, although
published only in 1977, is among the “most frequently cited law review articles of
modern times.” Ann Lousin, Justice Brennan: A Tribute to a Federal Judge Who
Believes in State’s Rights, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 2 n.3 (1986). Justice Stewart G.
Pollock of the New Jersey Supreme Court referred to Justice Brennan’s article as
the “Magna Carta of state constitutional law.” Stewart G. Pollock, State
Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 707, 716
(1983). Justice Brennan updated his views in The Bill of Rights and the States: The
Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535
(1986).
35. 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970).
36. Id. at 401–02 (emphasis added). See Thomas V. Van Flein, The Baker
Doctrine and the New Federalism: Developing Independent Constitutional Principles
Under the Alaska Constitution, 21 ALASKA L. REV. 227, 242 (2004) (“Each individual
state, including Alaska, should reevaluate its respective state constitution and
promote the development of state law independently of federal doctrine.”); see
generally Schwaiger, supra note 4.
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extremely positive attribute of American constitutionalism.37 This is
clearly recognized by courts in Alaska. Justice Liu said: “The
redundancies built into our structure of government largely serve to
channel and manage conflict rather than to facilitate permanent
resolution.”38 He continued:
State constitutionalism is properly understood as a mechanism
by which ongoing disagreement over fundamental principles is
acknowledged and channeled in our democracy. Far from
endangering the legitimacy of constitutional law, interpretive
pluralism is a source of its resilience and deep resonance with
our diverse citizenry. When a state court departs from Supreme
Court precedent to secure greater protection for individual
rights under a parallel provision of its state constitution, the state
court “registers a forceful and often very public dissent.”
Whether or not it influences other states or eventually induces
the Supreme Court to reconsider its precedent, the state decision
carries forward a dialogue over the meaning of our basic
liberties. In short, state constitutionalism is one way in which our
structure of government provides an outlet for constitutional
conflict.39
States such as Alaska have now progressed quite far into the New Judicial
Federalism. One may ask whether this movement has resulted in
enhanced rights protection for Americans. One point of view holds:
By diffusing governmental power, federalism permits the
constituent units of a federal system to determine to a significant
extent the ends that they will pursue and the means by which
they will accomplish those ends. Implicit in federal
arrangements is the expectation that the retention of these
choices by the constituent governments will produce diversity;
that given the opportunity, these governments will order their
affairs in diverse ways. Thus, federalism can claim to serve the
ends of both pluralism and self-government. In doing so,
however, federalism necessarily sacrifices complete uniformity
of treatment for those ruled by the various constituent
governments. Put simply, in a federal system many of the laws
one must obey, the benefits one receives, and the rights one

37. Goodwin Liu, Brennan Lecture, State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights: A Reappraisal, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1307, 1313 (2017).
38. Id. at 1335.
39. Id. at 1336.
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enjoys depend on the political jurisdiction in which one
resides.40
Other scholars have put it a bit differently:
Any system that enhances some norms must, perforce, diminish
others. It is clear that the norm of efficiency is not fostered by the
dispersal of judicial power. It is certainly cheaper and easier to
understand and deal with a court system with one set of rules,
decisions, and rights than it is to deal with fifty-one. To the
extent that judicial federalism allows or even encourages
differential treatment of issues and people, the norm of
uniformity is also clearly a victim. But we must be careful to
point out that uniformity neither guarantees nor prevents
equitable treatment. To confuse uniformity with justice in all
cases would be a grave error.41
Here, the positive aspects of “redundancy,” discussed earlier, must be
kept in mind. The Alaska Constitution provides numerous provisions
that should be viewed in this light.42

IV. THE ALASKA CONSTITUTION IN THE NATIONAL CONTEXT
American state constitutions, by contrast to our Federal
Constitution, lend themselves to comparative analysis. In many respects,
Alaska’s Constitution compares favorably.
Alaska has opted for the minority view that state judges should be
appointed, but run for retention.43 As Professor Charles Geyh has recently
stated, “Without legitimacy, the judiciary is helpless to thwart defiance of
its decisions.”44 If a state like Alaska installs an appointive system and the
“public ceases to trust judges or those who appoint judges,” then opting
for electoral accountability could “preserve or restore legitimacy.”45 On
the other hand, if the public comes to view an electoral system as
40. ELLIS KATZ & G. ALAN TARR, FEDERALISM AND RIGHTS ix–x (1996).
41. MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE & JAMES L. WALKER, RESPECTING STATE COURTS: THE
INEVITABILITY OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 141 (1999).
42. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. VII, §§ 1, 4–5.
43. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, §§ 5–6; see also Albert J. Klumpp, Alaska’s Judicial
Retention Elections: A Comparative Analysis, 34 ALASKA L. REV. 143, 146–47 (2017)
(stating that twenty-two U.S. states require at least some judges to be elected for
retention); Teri Carns & Susie Dosik, Alaska’s Merit Selection of Judges: The Council’s
Role, Past and Present, 35 ALASKA L. REV. 177 (2018); Walter Carpeneti & Brett
Frazer, Merit Selection of Judges in Alaska: the Judicial Council, the Independence of the
Judiciary, and the Popular Will, 35 ALASKA L. REV. 205 (2018).
44. Charles Gardner Geyh, Judicial Selection and the Search for Middle Ground,
67 DEPAUL L. REV. 333, 367 (2018).
45. Id.
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“including the perception that justice is for sale in privately financed
judicial campaigns,” the pressure will arise for an appointed system.46
Alan Tarr has described the controversy in state courts:
Both sides in the contemporary debate over judicial
independence and judicial accountability—we shall refer to
them as the Bashers and the Defenders—claim to support the
rule of law, but they disagree about what threatens it. Defenders
see the danger as coming from external pressures on judges by
those who seek to influence or intimidate them or induce them
to abandon their commitment to the law in favor of what is
popular or politically acceptable. But Bashers view the danger as
rooted in the absence of checks on judges, which frees them to
pursue their political or ideological or professional or class
agendas at the expense of fidelity to the law. Impartial decision
making, according to Bashers, is best promoted by the prospect
of retribution for judicial activism, which keeps in line judges
who might otherwise be tempted to read their own preferences
into the law.47
What about the content of the Alaska Constitution? One analysis has
concluded that only twenty-two percent of Alaska’s constitution consists
of policy-oriented provisions,48 well below the national average of about
forty percent.49 Of course, what constitutes a policy-oriented provision
rather than a framework-oriented provision can be in the eye of the
beholder, and neutral, academic observers may not appreciate the
important historic and political reasons why state constitutions contain
certain detailed provisions.
Notably, despite its focus on a non-innovative state constitution, the
Alaska Constitutional Convention did debate the possibility of a
unicameral legislature.50 The Convention ultimately opted for a bicameral
legislature, declining to adopt Nebraska’s unicameral legislature model.51
46. Id. at 367–68.
47. G. ALAN TARR, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND
JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE STATES 2 (2012).
48. Christopher W. Hammons, Was James Madison Wrong? Rethinking the
American Preference for Short Framework-Oriented Constitution, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
837, 837, 847 (1999) (referring to policy-oriented provisions as “particularistic”).
49. Hammons, supra note 21; see also Hammons, supra note 48, at 840
(“[Thirty-nine percent] of the typical state constitution is devoted to matters that
most scholars consider extraneous at best.”).
50. Jonathan S. Ross, Note, A New Answer for an Old Question: Should Alaska
Once Again Consider a Unicameral Legislature, 27 ALASKA L. REV. 257, 264–71 (2010);
see also GERALD A. MCBEATH, THE ALASKA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE
GUIDE 70 (1997).
51. ROBERT D. MIEWALD & PETER J. LONGO, THE NEBRASKA STATE
CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 19, 55–57 (1993).
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The Convention also followed many other state constitutions in
endowing the governor with the item veto.52 Following the model of a
number of state constitutions adopted in the Progressive Era,53 the
Convention opted to supplement legislative power with the initiative
process.54
The Convention also included a mandate of a public education,
following the lead of the existing states.55 The area of public school
financing has been among the important areas of state constitutional
litigation since the defeat of a federal claim for equal and adequate
funding of public schools.56 Education is one of the most important
reserved powers of the states and is predictably a topic that is covered in
state constitutions.
Among the most misunderstood state constitutional provisions are
the varied equality guarantees.57 The Alaska Supreme Court has
interpreted the Alaska Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause58 to be
“more protective of individual rights than the Federal Equal Protection
clause.”59 In 2016, for example, the Alaska Supreme Court struck down a
parental notification requirement for minors’ abortions under the Alaska
equality clause.60
Another major area of litigation under state constitutions has been
free speech and assembly protections on private property such as

52. See Nicholas Passarello, Note, The Item Veto and the Threat of Appropriations
Bundling in Alaska, 30 ALASKA L. REV. 125, 131 (2015) (“Most state governors
possess at least some form of item veto.”). This additional gubernatorial check on
the legislative branch, envied by every President, has been an important tool for
governors’ involvement with the fiscal affairs of the state. See generally Richard
Briffault, The Item Veto in State Courts, 66 TEMPLE L. REV. 1171 (1993).
53. See generally John Dinan, Framing a “People’s Government”: State
Constitution-Making in the Progressive Era, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 933 (1999).
54. M. Katheryn Bradley & Deborah L. Williams, “Be It Enacted by the People
of the State of Alaska . . .” —A Practitioner’s Guide to Alaska’s Initiative Law, 9 ALASKA
L. REV. 279, 279 (1992); see generally Logan T. Mohs, Note, Alaska’s Initiative Process:
The Benefits of Advanced Oversight and a Recommendation for Change, 31 ALASKA L.
REV. 295 (2014).
55. Chris Lott, Note, The Methodological Middle Ground: Finding an Adequacy
Standard in Alaska’s Education Clause, 24 ALASKA L. REV. 73 (2007); Kate Wheelock,
The Future of Challenges to the Alaska Public School Funding Scheme after State v.
Ketchikan, 34 ALASKA L. REV. 111, 126 (2017).
56. See generally San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973);
Jeffrey S. Sutton, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez and Its
Aftermath, 94 VA. L. REV. 1963 (2008).
57. WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 211–16.
58. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1 (“all persons are equal and entitled to equal
rights”).
59. State v. Anthony, 810 P.2d 155, 157 (Alaska 1991).
60. Planned Parenthood of the Great Nw. v. State, 375 P.3d 1122, 1128 (Alaska
2016).
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shopping malls.61 Federal First Amendment free speech doctrine does not,
as of now, protect free speech and assembly on such private property.62
The question, one of “state action,” has been analyzed in the Alaskan
context in the pages of this Law Review.63
Unlike the provisions in most state constitutions dealing with
religion,64 Alaska’s Article I, Section 4 is very brief and mirrors the federal
First Amendment.65 Despite its similar structure, however, it does not
have to be interpreted the same way the United States Supreme Court
interprets the First Amendment.66
The automatic referendum is one of Alaska’s choices of how to
balance the interests of rigidity and ease of change, a tension present in
every constitution. For example, whereas Thomas Jefferson supported
easily amendable constitutions with review every generation,67 James
Madison supported more permanent constitutions.68 As I have said, “If
state constitutional revision is too difficult, constitutionalism overwhelms
democracy; if it is too easy, democracy overwhelms constitutionalism. It
is difficult to achieve exactly the right balance, and this point might
change over time.”69 The automatic referendum on constitutional
conventions errs on the side of democracy over constitutionalism, by
increasing the ease of constitutional revision.70
61. See generally Jennifer A. Klear, Comparison of the Federal Courts’ and the New
Jersey Supreme Court’s Treatments of Free Speech on Private Property: Where Won’t We
Have the Freedom to Speak Next? 33 RUTGERS L.J. 589 (2002).
62. Id. at 590–95.
63. See generally Scott J. Nordstrand & Paul D. Seyferth, Private Rights Versus
Public Power: The Role of State Action in Alaska Constitutional Jurisprudence, 7 ALASKA
L. REV. 299 (1990).
64. See generally Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Religion Clauses:
Lessons from the New Judicial Federalism, 7 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 192
(2013).
65. See Steven Keith Green, Freedom of Religion in Alaska: Interpreting the Alaska
Constitution, 5 ALASKA L. REV. 237, 239 (1988) (stating “the language of section 4 is
taken almost verbatim from the religion clauses of the first amendment to the
United States Constitution”).
66. WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 135–39.
67. WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 363. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel
Kercheval (July 12, 1816) in THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 1395, 1402 (Library of
America ed. 1984). For a complete analysis of Jefferson’s attitudes toward
constitutional change, see JOHN R. VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDING PROCESS
IN AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 59–78 (1992); see also Merrill D. Peterson, Mr.
Jefferson’s “Sovereignty of the Living Generation”, 52 VA. Q. REV. 437, 437–44 (1976).
68. WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 363.
69. Id.
70. See Robert J. Martineau, The Mandatory Referendum on Calling a State
Constitutional Convention: Enforcing the People’s Right to Reform Their Government,
31 OHIO ST. U. L. REV. 421, 423–26 (1970) (explaining that the mandatory
referendum regularly submits the question of calling a constitutional convention
directly to the people of the state). See generally Gerald Benjamin, The Mandatory
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Political scientists Gerald Benjamin and Thomas Gais have observed
what they call “conventionphobia” in the United States.71 Even states with
an automatic vote on whether to call a convention have not had recent
success.72 The Alaska Constitutional Convention adopted the automatic
referendum, requiring a decision every ten years on whether to call a
constitutional convention.73 Such a referendum, however, has never been
approved.74
The public has continued to vote against conventions even as
dissatisfaction with state governments has increased.75 The public seems
to view a constitutional convention as political business as usual by the
“government industry,”76 indicating a sentiment that a convention would
not produce any beneficial changes.
Constitutional conventions seem to have lost their legitimacy in
the public mind. At the time many states’ original constitutions
were drafted, the politicians and special interests were afraid of
the people acting through constitutional conventions. Now, by
contrast, the people are afraid of politicians and special interests
acting through constitutional conventions.77
These observations may be true in Alaska.
The Alaska Constitution, unlike a number of other state
constitutions, does not contain an explicit separation-of-powers clause.78
Some state courts place special emphasis on the fact that their
constitutions contain a textual mandate of separation of powers.79 Even
without a textual mandate, the Alaska Supreme Court, of course, applies

Constitutional Convention Question Referendum: The New York Experience in National
Context, in STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE POLITICS OF
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 145 (G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams eds., 2006)
(detailing the role of the automatic referendum in New York). But see supra note
28 and accompanying text.
71. See generally Gerald Benjamin & Thomas Gais, Constitutional
Conventionphobia, 1 HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y SYMP. 53 (1996).
72. See id. at 69–70 (detailing recent failures of automatic referendums).
73. MCBEATH, supra note 50, at 214–15.
74. Id. at 215.
75. See Benjamin & Gais, supra note 71 (noting “the pervasive public hostility
to government institutions is automatically extended to conventions”).
76. Benjamin & Gais, supra note 71, at 71; see also Thomas Gais & Gerald
Benjamin, Public Discontent and the Decline of Deliberation: A Dilemma in State
Constitutional Reform, 68 TEMPLE L. REV. 1291, 1304 (1995) (noting “public cynicism
about permanent governmental institutions carries over into views regarding
constitutional conventions”).
77. WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 388.
78. MCBEATH, supra note 50, at 69.
79. Id. at 237–38. See generally G. Alan Tarr, Interpreting the Separation of Powers
in State Constitutions, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 329 (2003).

35.2 WILLIAMS (DO NOT DELETE)

154

2/28/2019 4:16 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35:2

a separation of powers doctrine.80 This is despite the fact that the federal
constitutional doctrine does not apply to the states.81
The Alaska Constitution is also unique in its approach to natural
resources. As Gerald McBeath has asserted: “Alaska is the only state that
has a clear and explicit article in its basic law on natural resources.”82 This
article may be compared favorably with other later state constitutions’
environmental and natural resource provisions.83
The Alaska Constitution specifically prohibits a limited state
constitutional convention.84 This can further impede voter approval of a
state constitutional convention.85 Perhaps the time will come when the
Alaska Constitution should be evaluated to determine whether it is still,
in Alan Tarr’s term, “coherent.” This can be a useful exercise.

IV. CONCLUSION
John Bebout, who consulted on the drafting of New Jersey’s “model”
1947 Constitution, provided advice to Alaska’s constitution makers. In
1991, Bebout said, “Alaska’s is, on the whole, the best written constitution
in the country . . . .”86 Alaska’s drafters made practical use of the lessons
developed over almost two centuries of state constitution making. They
were keenly aware of Alaska’s potential place within a federal union and,
at the same time, its unique challenges. This simultaneous awareness of
state and federal contexts is the hallmark of American state
constitutionalism.

80. Tarr, supra note 79.
81. WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 240.
82. MCBEATH, supra note 50, at 15.
83. See generally Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Environmental Policy and State
Constitutions: The Potential Role of Substantive Guidance, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 863 (1996).
84. ALASKA CONST. art. XIII, § 4.
85. MCBEATH, supra note 50, at 216; see also G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams,
Foreword, Getting from Here to There: Twenty-First Century Mechanisms and
Opportunities in State Constitutional Reform, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1075, 1085–92 (2005)
(discussing the benefits and legality of limited state constitutional conventions).
86. MCBEATH, supra note 50, at 20.

